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Abstract 
The article weaves Lacanian psychoanalysis with narratology. It explores the 
Beckettian logic of narrative detritus in The Trilogy by examining stories, 
progressively “worsened” with every act of narration. Reading these obsessive-
compulsive moments of narrative as failure, it sheds light on the various techniques 
and implications of this experiment that range from freezing a narrative into stasis 
to pushing it toward the limits of speculation and from forcing the narrative to 
revolve around its exterior to underlining its artifice through narratorial intrusions. 
The article focuses on the vestigial story-function to underscore the paradoxical 
status of Beckett’s narrative impulse and demonstrates how the drift of these 
narrations relocates storytelling from the subjective pole of the “I” to the opacity of 
language as a field of the Other and finally into the originary and the terminal 
silence that conditions narrative. The article reads Beckett’s assaults on the realistic 
narrative logic of the novel in tandem with an aporetic narrative logic that emerges 
from Lacanian psychoanalysis with its emphasis on the Real, as opposed to realism.  
Introduction 
This paper is an attempt to discuss the narrative act that connects psychoanalysis 
with literature. Both in the clinic and in the novel, we have someone telling the 
story of their life. The life-narrative we find on the couch as well as on the page is 
anything but linear and simple. The holes in clinical narratives often mark the 
traumatisme or the singular symptomatology of the particular analysand’s 
subjective history. Thus an analyst has to pay attention to the failures in narration 
(slips, hesitations, digressions, stutters) on the couch that are an integral part of the 
emerging narrative. In Samuel Beckett’s literary works, there is both a compulsion 
and a failure of telling stories. This double-bind becomes a fruitful place to think 
through narrative and narratology from a psychoanalytic vantage. As we shall see, 
the act of narrating one’s life and associated lives of others, involves many 
enigmatic narrative gaps, dead-ends and a complex power dynamic. Situating the 
question in Beckett’s mid-20th century trilogy of novels, Molloy, Malone Dies and 
The Unnamable, I will trace the ways in which Beckett enacts the multi-
dimensional failure of simple storytelling. I will connect these problems with a 
Lacanian psychoanalytic understanding of how narrating a life encounters 
difficulties of subject-formation and stumbles into the unspeakable and the 
impossible-to-narrate. This is where we will come to locate narrative as detritus or 
waste in Beckett and in Lacan, thus in both literature and psychoanalysis.  	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In the past few years, we have noticed a newfound interest in Lacanian approaches 
to Beckett. Llewellyn Brown has written on voice and gaze in Beckett following 
Lacan’s leads on the two topics.2 I have interpreted Beckett’s use of mathematical 
formalization through later-Lacan’s investment in mathematical discourse in 
relation to the unspeakable and impossible Real.3 Slavoj Žižek has drawn our 
attention to the importance of a writer like Beckett for Lacan’s psychoanalytic 
project, in spite of Lacan’s relative silence on Beckett, compared to his strong 
engagement with one of Beckett’s mentors, the great Irish Modernist writer, James 
Joyce (see Žižek, 2009, n.p.). For example, Zizek has highlighted the importance of 
cut and rupture in Beckett and how this endears him to Lacan. He has also dealt at 
length with the drive and its compulsive aspect in Beckett—all relevant for our 
following discussion.   
 
Beckett’s Molloy articulates: “What I need now is stories, it took me a long time to 
know that, and I’m not sure of it” (p. 9). Moran responds to this when he says: 
“Stories, stories. I have not been able to tell them. I shall not be able to tell this one” 
(p. 132). In the space between these two statements or the cleft between the need for 
stories and the failure to tell them, Beckett preserves the minimal remains of a 
narrative. His work foregrounds a narrative arc which performs failure of 
representation and narration. Brian Richardson calls this “denarration” or narrative 
negation (168). Beckett negates the opening statements of Moran’s narrative in 
Molloy with the novel’s ending: “Then I went back into the house and wrote, It’s 
midnight. The rain is beating on the windows. It was not midnight. It was not 
raining” (p. 170). As Debra Malina has shown in her study of narrative metalepsis 
in Beckett (see Malina, 2002, 25-62), it erases differences, not only between the 
intra-textual narrative layers but also between the textual and the extra-textual 
reality. Not to overemphasize narrative negation, let me say that it is only one of the 
two mechanisms in a narrative dialectic in which both construction and negation are 
significant. In Beckett’s narrative dialectic, construction through negation and vice 
versa is not synthetic but prosthetic. An aporetic and unknowable impasse replaces 
narrative closure. I will return to this impasse through a Lacanian logic of the Real. 
In what Malina calls Beckett’s “construction compulsion” (2002, p. 25), negation 
and construction are complementary and the narrative is precisely what remains at 
the terminus when the dialectical tension of negation and construction produces 
narrative detritus. Lacan’s definition of language in Seminar XX as “knowledge’s 
hare-brained lucubration” (p. 139) on lalangue implies that lalangue is what 
remains of language when knowledge is separated from it: “the water of language 
happens to leave something behind as it passes, some detritus […]” (Lacan, 1975, p. 
16; emphasis added). I would argue that this minimal narrative remainder is marked 
by the Real antinomy of the letter (a tension or even a contradiction between the 
semantic level of the word, i.e., the signifier and the material and syntactic level of 
the word in the letter which marks the unspeakable Real), which installs an impasse 
to narrative signification. 
 
Narrative Closure and Signification 
Peter Brooks constructs an interface of narratology and Freudian psychoanalysis in 
terms of narrative as desire. In this spectrum, the end of a narrative finally produces 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Brown’s books, Beckett, Lacan and the Voice and Beckett, Lacan and the Gaze.  
3 See my book, Beckett, Lacan and the Mathematical Writing of the Real.  
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readerly gratification by offering an object which either fulfils or betrays narrative 
expectations. For Brooks, the end of a narrative retroactively gives it full 
significance, like the period that completes the sense of a sentence: “If the motor of 
narrative is desire, totalizing, building ever-larger units of meaning, the ultimate 
determinants of meaning lie at the end, and narrative desire is ultimately, 
inexplicably, desire for the end” (p. 52; emphases in the original).  
 
As opposed to Brooks’s thesis that narrative end is signifying, I would argue that 
narrative end in Beckett hardly offers a closure. Narrative jettisons itself into a 
terminality that does not signify the narrative but installs itself as a non-signifying 
Real. The end of a narrative activates Beckettian “metalepsis” (a narratological 
technique to mark the breakdown of difference between multiple layers of a 
narrative wherein material from one discrete layer intrudes the other) and produces 
a jettisoning effect, turning the end into an impasse and not a retrospective generator 
of signification. Highlighting this substitution of a signifying narrative closure with 
a non-signifying narrative impasse and the implications it could have for a 
psychoanalytic narrative logic, I will turn, not to the Beckettian narrative as a 
(w)hole but to the tiny “ill-said” stories within The Trilogy that persist as bristling 
remainders in Beckett’s narrative dialectic. These meta-diegetic stories are told in 
increasingly worsening ways: “I tell this story worse and worse” (Beckett, 2003, p. 
102).  
 
Self-reflexively tedious repetitions, ludicrous compressions and tangential narrative 
doors characterize these vestigial stories. In this narrative experiment, techniques 
range from freezing narrative motion into ambivalent stasis to pushing it towards 
the furthest limits of speculation, from forcing the narrative to revolve around its 
exterior to disclosing its constructedness through narratorial intrusions. I would 
argue that these stories sabotage assumptions of narrative reality ` replace it with a 
logic of the Real, defined as the impossible by Lacan: “this impossibility by which a 
real is defined” (Lacan, 1998b, p. 144). They enact the paradoxical status of 
Beckett’s narrative impulse where the nothingness of stories meets the necessity of 
storytelling. They shift the emphasis of narration from the subjective locus of the 
“I” to the enigma of language as the order of the Other and finally into the originary 
as well as the terminal silence that monitors narrative. In a psychoanalytic 
understanding, narrative becomes a linguistic and discursive site in which the 
subject’s desire is alienated in the desires of significant Others. The narrative act 
exposes this dialectical oscillation of power between the subject and the linguistic 
field of the Other. 
Narrative Detritus in ‘The Trilogy’ 
Storytelling, Non-Relation and Death 
The first failed narrative in The Trilogy concerns Molloy’s early effort to envisage 
an encounter between A and C, the two wayfarers from vast distance in a gradually 
forming valley as they fleetingly meet one another, soon to go their separate ways. 
The fragmented narrative act indicates a writer’s first attempt to enform a stillborn 
story. The alphabetical names and the anonymous setting slowly start acquiring 
local colors and yet the generic narrative never flourishes. The metonymic 
accumulation of realistic details and the possibilities of narrative expansion remain 
futile as A and C, instead of initiating a conversation as a form of relationality that 
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could extend into a story, halt “face to face” and “breast to breast” (p. 5). From the 
narrator’s distant presence, it is impossible to understand whether they know each 
other and stop to share mutual greetings or simply pause at the sight of a fellow 
human being. As this false start dissipates, the narrator becomes increasingly unsure 
about who A and C are and the last we hear of them is the announcement of greater 
uncertainty as the narrator expresses his doubts about recognizing them in the 
future. This narrative remains inanimate and fleeting, but what fails it is the 
narrator’s ignorance and his absolute inability to reach and read his characters. This 
aspect of not knowing which leads to narrative failure is important.    
 
Malone’s sickbed narratives to pass time as his time passes into death, dramatize 
another storytelling act in The Trilogy. At the outset, Malone promises to tell 
himself four discrete stories: “one about a man, another about a woman, a third 
about a thing and finally one about an animal, a bird probably” (p. 175). When he 
starts telling them, the stories inter-contaminate one another. The story of the first 
boy-man, Saposcat merges with the story of the “bird”. The bird is not only a literal 
presence with horses and hens in his friend’s family but a symbolic presence as 
well. At a certain point, his story suddenly mutates into the story of Macmann and 
his experience in the mental asylum where he has a bizarre affair with his attendant 
Moll. It is in this story that we have the most important function of “a thing”, i.e., 
the Christ-shaped solitary tooth that sparkles inside Moll’s bare mouth. This is how 
the four different stories overlap one another. This metaleptic collapse of meta-
diegetic levels (discrete layers framed by the narrative, each of which nestles a story 
in itself), reaches a climax when the novel ends inside Macmann’s asylum story. 
Malone dies inside his story. We never return to the frame-narrative, i.e., his 
sickbed act of telling stories about human beings, animals and inanimate objects to 
himself. The last sentence of the novel, devoid of punctuation mark, hovers on the 
tipping point with the repeated alternations of “or”. The sentence corporeally sinks 
into the narrative silence of death as Beckett flips the horizontal arrangement into 
the vertical:  
 
or with it or with his hammer or with his stick or with his fist or in thought in 
dream I mean never he will never 
 
or with his pencil or with his stick or 
 
or light light I mean  
 
never there he will never 
 
never anything 
 
there 
 
any more (p. 281) 
 
As Malone’s death is conflated with the death of his stories, the narrative end, 
instead of embodying a closure, creates a collapse where the storytelling subject is 
internalized in his own narrative and his death is also encapsulated by it. This end 
does not give meaning to Malone’s narrative life but, like death, it becomes a figure 
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of the unknowable, slotted in the undecidable breach between the frame-narrative 
and the meta-diegetic narratives. The reference to Malone’s pencil and stick in the 
quote above signals narrative metalepsis by bridging the gap between Malone’s 
frame narrative and the meta-narrative about Macmann.  
 
Let us look at the Saposcat story to trace its narrative impasse. The Sapo story is 
consistently interrupted by comic narratorial intrusions that expose its fictional 
status: “What tedium” (p. 181), “Sapo had no friends—no, that won’t do” (p. 183) 
and “This is awful” (p. 185). Apart from these self-disparaging remarks about the 
narrative, Malone expresses his anxieties about losing his epistemic grasp over the 
story: “Already I forget what I have said. [...] Soon I shall not know where Sapo 
comes from, nor what he hopes” (p. 183). The storyteller’s ignorance about the 
shape of his stories and the life of the others within them is fundamental to this 
narrative impasse. Malone is aware that leaving a little door for darkness to seep 
into his story can ring its death-knell:  
 
For I want as little as possible of darkness in his story. A little darkness, in itself, 
at the time, is nothing. You think no more about it and you go on. But I know 
what darkness is, it accumulates, thickens, then suddenly bursts and drowns 
everything. (p. 184)  
 
Just as Sapo’s teachers cannot get anything into his head, the storyteller cannot read 
his protagonist. For Malone, Sapo remains opaque. This opacity of the material is a 
room for narrative failure. The analogy between the teacher and the storyteller is 
important because as we shall see, Beckett keeps returning to this pedagogic regime 
of storytelling. Martha Nussbaum has foregrounded this aspect in her reading of The 
Trilogy. Both teaching and storytelling are in shambles in Beckett. The more Sapo 
reads, the worse his results get and he becomes increasingly unreadable for the 
narrator. Sapo’s strange walk with halts and sudden starts, resembles the movement 
of the narrative as it oscillates between motion and stasis.  
 
Sapo’s stay at the neighborhood of the Lamberts—fellow farmers with horses, 
mules and hens around their house, introduces another failure of the story to take 
off. He goes and sits in the kitchen of the Lamberts. When they busy themselves in 
the day’s labours, Sapo is alone in the kitchen as light fades in and out of the room. 
In the darkening room, rays of light keep entering through the narrow slits, only to 
die their little deaths there. This darkening room in which silent Sapo sits alone, 
encapsulates a narrative darkness where the story, bereft of all possible dialogues 
and encounters, fails to launch itself. Non-relation is heightened as a grey hen 
habitually comes into Sapo’s kitchen penumbra. It is sensitive to Sapo’s presence 
and remains suspended between movement and stillness in a blinking state of 
anxiety. Yet both Sapo and the hen—and sometimes more than one hen—exchange 
gazes that meet but do not usher into any symbolic exchange. The failed 
communication between the boy and the animal marks another narrative impasse 
here. The narrator restores the question of ignorance with a speculation: if it is “a” 
grey hen or “the” grey hen and the ways of determining the precise number of grey 
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hen or hens in the Lamberts’ possession. As the kitchen abruptly sinks into a 
glistening dark, Sapo gets up and leaves the Lamberts’ house without a word and 
disappears. When the narrator follows this up with the episode of Mr. Saposcat, 
Sapo’s father bringing him a new fountain pen with a bird designed on its lid, it 
extends Malone’s promised theme of a bird by substituting the flesh-and-blood hen 
with the inanimate fakery of a bird. The animal mutates into a thing here as 
Malone’s narrative themes weave into one another. This metamorphosis of the 
animal into an object marks a symbolic or narrative death. The bird-pen cannot 
improve Sapo’s performance in school-exams. It ends up being the cause of a fight 
between his parents. This narrative thing kills the bird by transfixing it into an 
inanimate object that fails to improve Sapo’s academic performance. 
 
This symbolic death of the bird is immediately followed, in the Lamberts’ narrative, 
by the actual death of Old Lambert’s mule. Sapo watches its burial. This animal 
death could be seen as homology for a dying narrative. The mule’s corpse is as 
contorted and immovable as the story itself: “The forelegs were stretched out 
straight and rigid, the hind drawn up under the belly. The yawning jaws, the 
wreathed lips, the enormous teeth, the bulging eyes, composed a striking death’s 
head (p. 205)”. 
 
This “death’s head” will soon be followed up by its Latin “caput mortuum” in Texts 
for Nothing. Alchemically speaking, “caput mortuum” is the leftover of a chemical 
operation and the expression is not without its Lacanian echoes. For Lacan, it relates 
to the constitution of dead letters in the Real (Lacan, 2006, p. 38) and in these 
instances, we are looking at a range of narrative deaths that metaphorise “the 
essentially localized structure of the signifier” (Lacan, 2006, p. 418) as a Lacanian 
letter. In Beckett, the caput mortuum of the narrative is that which remains after the 
dialectic yields its residue in the form of a detritus. Animal deaths proliferate as Old 
Lambert becomes resigned about his old mules in the slaughter-house and Mrs. 
Lambert returns in the evening to Sapo’s darkening kitchen with a white rabbit to 
follow up on the black mule. When the Lamberts get ready for their rabbit dinner, 
Sapo is on his way back home. As Mrs. Lambert returns with the dead rabbit and 
Old Lambert decides to kill Whitey, the partner of the dead mule, the day after, 
Sapo tells Mrs. Lambert that he would never return to the farm. The Lamberts-
episode and Sapo’s story end with a portrait of Mrs. Lambert, feeling through the 
inert objects in the enigmatically darkening kitchen with her fretful family thoughts. 
Her daughter tells her that Sapo has quit them. This irreversibility of Sapo’s 
departure is articulated through another figure of death:  
 
Then as people do, when someone insignificant dies, they summoned up such 
memories, as he had left them, helping one another trying to agree. But we all 
know that little flame and its flickerings in the wild shadows. And agreement 
only comes a little later, with the forgetting. (p. 211) 
 
This final trope of Sapo’s metaphorical death for the Lamberts acts like a signature 
for the death of Sapo’s story. After an extended digression and interruption due to 
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loss of consciousness and the pencil slipping from Malone’s hand, when he returns 
to his story, he cannot call his character Sapo anymore and decides to name him 
Macmann. This is a transformative point. The narrative trope of death finishes off 
young Sapo and substitutes him with the old Macmann. Sapo’s decision not to 
return to the Lamberts could be seen as his reaction against their violence to 
animals. This is implied by the narrator’s reflective detour on the varying tenacity of 
hens, rabbits and, pigeons facing a deadly blow. If it is Sapo’s story and not the 
Lamberts’, why does Sapo’s permanent exit from the Lamberts’ farm become the 
death-knell for Sapo’s story? Given that Sapo is the protagonist, his decision not to 
return to the Lamberts could have marked the end of the Lamberts episode. But it 
becomes a collapsing point for the whole story, which shows how Sapo’s story had 
already become the Lamberts’ story. This narrative fluctuation is symptomatic of 
decentering and alienation. This is how narrative act itself becomes a tool of 
alienation for the subject. When we tell our stories in which Others creep in, on 
occasions, these stories pull the rug under our own feet as they become stories of 
Others. We become alienated in our own stories. It is in this way that Sapo’s story 
turns Lamberts’. Narrative impasse is caused by the inversion of protagonicity as a 
narrative principle, the trope of death and its literalization. It is also prompted by the 
subjective solitude of figures in the narrative who cannot establish any relationality. 
This is a world of non-communication and inertia that does not allow a story to 
expand. It contracts the story into a minimal remainder like the fleeting memory of 
the dead, as in the aforementioned passage.  
Other’s Narration, Power, and Pedagogy   
In The Unnamable, story-function shifts toward alterity. The stories told by the 
unnamable are filtered and circulated through Basil and Mahood—figures of non-
self—in relation to whom, he struggles to define his selfhood. The unnamable 
narrator admits that he is framed by these words of the Other. This signals that he is 
alienated from himself in and through these stories: “Having nothing to say, no 
words but the words of others, I have to speak” (p. 308), or “[…] I’m in words, 
made of words, other’s words […]” (p. 379). These are not his stories but Basil’s or 
Mahood’s. When they are his, insofar as they delineate him, they are mediated by 
the Other’s words that make him an Other in these narratives. The self is alienated 
into the Other through the storytelling function in The Unnamable. In the acute 
linguistic consciousness of the Beckettian subject, speech in a Lacanian way, 
registers the locus of the Other. For the unnamable, the regime of words introduces 
a tormenting teaching where speech is imposed on the subject: “It’s a poor trick that 
consists in ramming a set of words down your gullet on the principle that you can’t 
bring them up without being branded as belonging to their breed” (p. 318). Story 
function is subsumed in this disciplining regime of speech which not only works as 
an Other but dominates the subject when the unnamable tries to put an end to 
speech and fall headlong into a silence that would not pause speech but get rid of it 
altogether.  
 
This desired silence is not interruptive to speech but external to the Symbolic. The 
unnamable’s search for this narrative end is the novel’s compulsive drive. Though 
this seems to echo Peter Brooks’s narrative desire, the silence that envelopes this 
narrative end never arrives. The end of the novel gestures toward this silence 
axiomatically but it remains a tangent to the narrative. The terminal antinomy of 
The Unnamable is “you must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on” (p. 407). It points to 
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an impossibility of closure as the narrative infinitely involutes between the negation 
of “no” and the continuity of “on”. The elusive silence at the end is still a matter of 
future. This future is ambiguously divided by the present: “[…] it will be the 
silence, where I am, I don’t know, I’ll never know, […]” (p. 407; emphases added). 
Let us note the use of two tenses in the same sentence. Because this silence lies 
outside knowledge, there is no knowing if one is or isn’t in the silence. It frames the 
narrative as a liminal point. This strictly unreachable silence that all speech and 
stories come from and vanish into, is impossible to incorporate in a narrative; and 
yet the Beckettian narrative is obsessed with circulating this silence like a potter 
constitutes the void at the centre of his pot, to use Lacan’s example from Seminar 
VII. The potter constitutes the rim around the void, giving shape to the void that 
remains both inside and outside, i.e., within the pot as well as outside it (Lacan, 
1992, p. 121).  
 
This silence is Real inasmuch as it resists Symbolization in language and yet it is 
that which propels the Symbolic act. Lacan uses the neologism “extimate” to mark 
the internally excluded nature of this Real (Lacan, 1992, p. 139). It is inside as well 
as outside. The inside-outside distinction collapses in the face of this 
unsymbolizable Real. Instead of attaining it, the narrative revolves around the Real, 
like psychoanalytic drives that go round and round their object. When the subject 
finally thinks he is in this silence but cannot know, the Real becomes extimate in 
relation to the narrative. The Real Silence is both reached and not reached and the 
Real is antinomically inscribed in this present, invading the future where the future 
wrenches itself away from the present. This is the impossible logic of the Real that 
frames the Beckettian narrative. When Lacan, in his supplementary modal logic, 
adds the fourth figure of the “impossible” to the Aristotelian triad of the 
“necessary”, the “contingent” and the “possible”, it takes contradiction out by 
incorporating it within the logical square. This is how, for Lacan, logic passes into 
what he calls the “science of the Real”. In the eighth session of Seminar XXI, 
following Freud that the logic of the unconscious does not know the principle of 
contradiction, Lacan reflects that the unconscious prefers a “both and” over an 
“either or” logic in the formation of the impossible as the Real: 
 
And this indeed is why what I marked about the impossible, namely, what 
separates, but otherwise than is done by the possible, it is not an either-or, it is a 
both-and. In other words, that it should be at the same time p and non-p is 
impossible, it is precisely what you reject in the principle of contradiction. 
(Seminar XXI, session of 19.2.1974, emphasis added) 
 
With this installation of the impossible, narrative stops and continues. The Real 
makes narrative closure impossible. In Lacan’s orthographic schema, it is a writing 
that “doesn’t stop not being written” (Lacan, 1998b, p. 94). For Lacan, the Real is a 
narrative in which the negation of narrative never stops being written; this negation 
is written again and again ad infinitum and, hence, Beckett would say, “you must go 
on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on”. 
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Let me explore some vestigial narratives in The Unnamable to illustrate this logic of 
the Real that insists on narrative limit and the impossibility of knowing the narrative 
from the storyteller’s perspective. This Real non-knowledge collapses narrative 
closure. The first sustained narrative act in The Unnamable concerns the story of his 
“world tour” spanning multiple centuries at the end of which, he returns to the 
remains of his devastated family, perished from sausage-poisoning. The unnamable 
tells this story only because it is a task imposed on him. He hopes to walk out of 
stories and speaking by finishing this telling. This is a story in which he mistakes 
himself for Mahood, thus, characterizing the narrative as a performance in self-
alienation (Beckett, 2006, p. 311). When the unnamable, lacking a leg and an arm 
and having just enough armpits to carry a crutch, wheels around his family, the 
members anxiously see him from a distance. By the time he reaches home, they are 
all dead and the place is full of stench and rotten body parts. The story ensures that 
there is no room for narrative relationality and no communication between the 
unnamable and his family members. While this story is obsessed with death and 
biological detritus, the story itself gestures toward a narrative detritus when the 
unnamable narrator crosses out the entire story:  
 
But enough of this nonsense. I was never anywhere but here, no one ever got me 
out of here. Enough of acting the infant who has been told so often how he was 
found under a cabbage that in the end he remembers the exact spot in the garden 
and the kind of life he led there before joining the family circle. (pp. 317-318)  
 
The story is easy to falsify because it comes from the Other as a narrative 
imposition. It subjects the subject to the Other’s conception of his subjectivity. The 
narrative negation here is imbued with an element of dissidence as the subject 
denies fictional demand for identification through narrative pedagogy. In this 
narrative dialectic of construction through negation, the prosthesis is not only the 
unnamable’s crutch but also the narrative detritus, produced by the subject’s non-
coincidence with the Other’s fiction. The subject does not know and cannot verify 
the story. The narrative act is halted by this ignorance. It tips the story onto the side 
of the unspeakable Real but there is no proof to demonstrate the falsity of the 
narrative. The fact that the unnamable does not remember cannot be an evidence, 
owing to the inevitability of human forgetting. It is an impossible and unknowable 
juncture in the narrative where it can neither go on nor stop for good and therefore it 
must mutate into another story. By virtue of the Real, these stories do not stop not 
being written, as narrative negation never produces a void. Something remains, be it 
Lacan’s double-negation (“doesn’t stop not being written”) that cannot be 
neutralized into an affirmation or Beckett’s ambivalence where the subject denies 
the Other’s fable of himself but can neither prove nor disprove it. In this impasse 
lies the impossibility of a logic that passes into the Real by evoking antinomies.  
 
The next story of Mahood, thrust upon the unnamable, produces a narrative 
mutation. It is about the unnamable’s stay in a glass jar at the meatshop. The shop is 
owned by a woman who not only uses his skull as an object of display and 
advertisement for the chop-
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instinct” (p. 323). Though this is a story about the unnamable, it mediates through 
Mahood as the Other and alienates his subjectivity by itemizing his skull as an 
object for the Other’s gaze. In this story, the unnamable experiences, though does 
not fully understand “the boon of tears” (p. 322) as they flow from his eyes 
unceasingly when the proprietress covers his jar with a tarpaulin on winter 
evenings. He speculates if tears signify his gratitude towards the lady. But he cannot 
be sure because he acknowledges this care to be cover for a simple logic of 
“capital”. After all, the unnamable serves the best and the most memorable 
“landmark” and “advertisement” for her shop (pp. 322-23). Non-communication 
rules when the unnamable, bereft of speech, props his head out of the jar and tries to 
communicate to his proprietress that he feels cold and wants to be shrouded. She 
fails to read his signs and things do not change: “[…] we made balls of it between 
us, I with my signs and she with her reading of them” (p. 323). The unnamable 
almost identifies with this story but he also remarks how the Others often stop 
stories at one point, just when he is beginning to invest in them subjectively and 
resume them at a different point. This confuses him and gives him an illusion of 
intermittent relief and freedom. Narrative resumptions are therefore part of the 
Other’s strategies. These are mutations and not resumptions. The mutation from one 
story to another is not consistent because they resume the fiction of the subject at a 
radically different and unrecognizable juncture: “[…] I mean instead of resuming 
me at the point where I was left off, they pick me up at a much later stage […]” (p. 
324).  
 
In what remains of this story, the unnamable starts to shrink inside the jar, as if to 
protest his objectification. This irritates the woman. She raises him by filling the 
bottom of the jar with sawdust. But with every passing day, he becomes so 
miniscule that she can hardly see or use him. This is where the story disintegrates 
with the subject on the brink of complete disappearance, contracted into an 
immovable detritus: eyes, ears, and a head—a minimal narrative remainder. Almost 
immediately after the story’s dissipation, the narrator marks the logic of the Real: 
“[…] being admitted to that peace where he neither is, nor is not, and where the 
language dies that permits of such expressions” (p. 328). This indeed is Beckett’s 
own articulation of a Lacanian Real logic where the axiom of the inexpressible 
constitutes the expressive act. In the impossible antinomy of the “is and the is not” 
lies the Real. As the unnamable reflects, “it’s a lot to expect of one creature” 
(Beckett, 2006, p. 328) to reach that Real. As Lacan in Seminar XI formulates, it can 
be axiomatically touched by an encounter. This is what The Unnamable sets out to 
inscribe. In the fifth session of Seminar XI, Lacan discusses the difference between 
Aristotle’s terms, tuché and automaton to observe that the Real is not a matter of 
deterministic fortune but a question of chance. The Real for Lacan is an impossible 
encounter (1998a, p. 53-64). It is an inscribed encounter and, in Beckett’s work, this 
Godot-like “missed encounter” becomes an irreducible signature of the Real.  
 
The final narrative remnant in The Unnamable is evoked in a pedagogic context, 
with an instrumental lesson in emotions, especially that of love. The unnamable 
repeats this story from the Other with ironic compression:  
 
They love each other, marry, in order to love each other better, more 
conveniently, he goes to the wars, he dies at the wars, she weeps, with emotion, 
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at having loved him, at having lost him, yep, marries again, in order to love 
again, more conveniently again, they love each other, you love as many times as 
necessary, as necessary in order to be happy, he comes back, the other comes 
back, from the wars, he didn’t die at the wars after all, she goes to the station, to 
meet him, he dies in the train, of emotion, at the thought of seeing her again, 
having her again, she weeps again, with emotion again, at having lost again, yep, 
goes back to the house, he’s dead, the other is dead, the mother-in-law takes him 
down, he hanged himself, with emotion, at the thought of losing her, she weeps, 
weeps louder, at having lost him, at having lost him, there’s a story for you, that 
was to teach me the nature of emotion, […] (p. 399) 
 
In this parody of conventional novelistic narrative, Beckett compresses a realistic 
sentimental novel in less than two hundred words. This story leads to a question or a 
hypothesis. It jettisons closure and asks an unanswerable question in the spirit of the 
Real. Lacan defines the Real not only as impossibility and unknowability but also as 
“an impasse of formalization” (Lacan, 1998b, p. 93). The narrative form here 
stumbles against a Real impasse. Following the story, the unnamable interrogates its 
narrative logic by asking a question that emerges from the demand of the realism, 
that shapes its conventional and contrived plot:  
 
[…] that must be the mother-in-law, I don’t know, it must be her son, since she 
cries, and the door, the house-door is bolted, when she got back from the station 
she found the house-door bolted, who bolted it, he the better to hang himself, or 
the mother-in-law the better to take him down, or to prevent her daughter-in-law 
from re-entering the premises, there’s a story for you, it must be the daughter-in-
law, it isn’t the son-in-law and the daughter, it’s the daughter-in-law and the son, 
how I reason this evening, it was to teach me how to reason […] (p. 400) 
 
The unnamable exercises the reasoning, taught through this narrative but it produces 
an aporia. It is not known who bolted the door. In this typical melodramatic 
situation, one would hardly care to answer a question about such an insignificant 
detail. The question falls within realism because it concerns the metonymic 
accumulation of details in a realistic text, keen on maintaining its logical 
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consistency. This realistic question exposes the realistic narrative to a point of 
ignorance where the narrative mutates into hypothetical speculation, marking its 
tangential exterior: “[…] who bolted the door, and for what purpose, I’ll never 
know, there’s a story for you […]” (p. 400). This question about the door activates 
the Real and bores a hole into the epistemic narrative foundation. The story does not 
have the question in it. The question, like the Real letter, is subjective. The 
unnamable sabotages the story with this question. This is a singular act of 
subjective subversion. The question is a Real detritus that mutates the “door” from a 
signifier to a letter. 
 
After this story, the unnamable returns to the “door” in an abstract context. The 
wooden door is abstracted into a narrative door on the brink of the Real silence. 
This transformation resembles the mutation of the real bird into the bird-pen in 
Malone Dies. As the door becomes a word from a wooden thing, it is rendered into 
the Real letter of the subject’s final question. This question does not come from the 
Other but constitutes his singularity in lalangue. This door is located at the terminal 
cusp of narrative and silence: “[…] perhaps it’s the door, perhaps I’m at the door 
[…] it’s I now at the door, what door, what’s a door doing here, it’s the last words, 
the true last […]” (p. 407). Here the narrator brings back the important distinction 
between a lasting silence which he calls an unreachable “dream of a silence” (p. 
407) and another silence which does not last. I would characterize the first as a Real 
silence, outside of the Symbolic, while the latter is a Symbolic silence that pauses 
speech-acts and itself speaks. The silence, which does not symbolize anything, is 
the unbreakable silence of the Real. The door is the margin of this Real silence. It 
can open out into the Real or open inward into the story. But, like the wooden door, 
this Real “door” punches a hole in knowledge by not opening at all: “[…] perhaps 
they have said me already, perhaps they have carried me to the threshold of my 
story, before the door that opens on my story, that would surprise me, if it opens 
[…] (p. 407)”.  
 
The “they” here refers both to the words as well as the Others who have introduced 
the story-function into the subject. These words and Others or these words as 
Others have “said” the unnamable throughout. Though this would give an 
impression of complete capitulation, I have marked how the said subject has also 
subverted the regime of the Other’s narrative by asking questions and failing their 
narrative lessons. The narrative act may constitute its own hegemony of power by 
alienating the narrative subject in the story of Other(s). But neither Beckett’s nor 
Lacan’s work upholds this politics of mastery. If at all, they both resist the narrative 
politics of masterfulness by underlining narrative failure. The only category of 
master Lacan identifies himself with, is the Zen Buddhist master. As he clarifies in 
the overture to his first seminar: 
 
That is how a buddhist master conducts his search for meaning, according to the 
technique of zen. It behoves the students to find out for themselves the answer to 
their own questions. The master does not teach ex cathedra a ready made 
science; he supplies an answer when the students are on the verge of finding it.  
	  Language	  and	  Psychoanalysis,	  2019,	  8	  (1),	  1-­‐14.	  http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.v8i1.1593	  	   13	  
This kind of teaching is a refusal of any system. It uncovers a thought in 
motion— nonetheless vulnerable to systematisation, since it necessarily 
possesses a dogmatic aspect. (Lacan, 1991, p. 1) 
In the above passage, Lacan connects Buddhist pedagogy with Freud’s teachings 
and underscores how both are anti-dogmatic and resist any authoritarian or 
dictatorial mastery. The master in the Lacanian tradition allows the analysand to 
find their answers, rather than dictating their own to those on the couch. In the 
pedagogic moments, studied in Beckett, we have seen an intense problematization 
of this trope of masterful omnipotence vis-à-vis narrative.      
 
To return to The Unnamable, the hypothetical opening of the door would open the 
ambivalent future of entering the Real silence where the subject would finally be at 
one with his self-articulation in the “I”. But this future, driven by the present, as we 
have seen above, is only an undecidable Real tangent. In the tripartite Lacanian 
subject, this “signifying cut” of the Symbolic order where the subject speaks and is 
spoken by language, points to the Real of the subject. This Real can only be 
registered as an impasse, a rift or a discontinuity: “The cut made by the signifying 
chain is the only cut that verifies the structure of the subject as a discontinuity in the 
real” (Lacan, 2006, p. 678). The Real subject, like the Real silence outside 
language, remains a hole which the narrative constitutes as a detritus after the 
exhaustive dialectic of construction through negation and vice versa finishes its 
work. This remainder is a Real crack that punches a gaping hole in the signifying 
apparatus of language and its narrative constructions. 
 
Fundamentally speaking, psychoanalysis can never entirely do without narrative 
because the analysands always constitute their clinical history through free-
association. In spite of assaults, there is still narrative in Beckett, reduced to the 
mathematical and corporeal dimension of the letter. The analysand’s speech 
similarly signs narrative in the letter of a detritus. This cannot be a linear and 
expansive realistic narrative. In Beckettian terms, if the unnamable is in the 
analysand’s position, Lacan does not want to become his master like Basil or 
Mahood by imposing a narrative on him. This is precisely the tradition of ego-
psychology that Lacan resisted. For him, psychoanalysis is about the analysand. The 
analyst’s mastery is supposed be trashed by the end of analysis. The Lacanian 
analyst is not a master. They have no messianic secret to cure the analysand with. On 
the contrary, the Lacanian trajectory of analysis lies in trashing the transferential 
mastery of the analyst as a “subject supposed to know”—Lacan’s formula for 
transference. This jettisoning of the analyst as a locus of supposed epistemic mastery 
exposes the fact the analyst does not know anything other than what the analysand 
speaks on the couch. Lacan does not want to use narrative as a form of power and 
domination. It is at this point that his work resonates with Beckett who not only 
exposes narrative linearity of realism as a form of epistemic power but also punches 
a hole in that epistemic narrative power with the logic of the Real by insisting on 
ignorance and impasse. In Beckett, what remains after the exhaustive narrative 
dialectic of constructive negation and negative construction is a narrative detritus in 
which realism is subverted by the Real.  
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